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RIPPING OFF THE BAND-AID: SCRUTINY BUNDLING IN THE
WAKE OF SOCIAL DISAPPROVAL






Activities that hazard the possibility of increased scrutiny are an unavoidable reality for
many firms.While managersmay face the need to engage in these activities, there is little
research on when managers decide to do so. Existing theoretical perspectives on status
quo deviations have not sufficiently addressed how managers order the firm’s essential
activities that differ primarily in terms of the scrutiny those activities engender. Drawing
from concepts in the accounting and political science literatures, we advance a “scru-
tiny-bundling” perspective that suggests that firms engage in scrutiny-hazarding action
in the wake of social disapproval, assessed in this study via negative media coverage.
We further theorize that a strong linkage between the focus of media coverage and the
specific scrutiny-hazarding action exacerbates this relationship. We then contend that
managers at firms that are either large in size or that perform well relative to their
aspirations are less sensitive to social disapproval, and are therefore less likely to en-
gage in scrutiny bundling. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 100 firms in the
upstream petroleum industry and find general support for our theories.
Unpopular organizational actions are often
unavoidable. Firms must sometimes engage in ac-
tivities that burden the organizationwith unwanted
scrutiny, but are nevertheless integral to the firm’s
strategy. For example, a steel manufacturer may
need to run a plant that releases sulfur dioxide and
other pollutants, a petroleum firmmay need to drill
for oil, and a forestry firm may harvest lumber.
Unfortunately, the available literature has provided
little guidance on when managers will pursue such
activities, particularly when the firm is already
burdened with stakeholders’ negative affinity, or
“social disapproval” (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
Moreover, though there have been substantial re-
cent strides in our understanding of the elements
and origins of social approval (e.g., Bundy&Pfarrer,
2015), we still know relatively little about how
social disapproval influences subsequent decision-
making (Petkova,Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2014). Even
less clear is when managers might engage in
activities that hazard potentially burdensome
scrutiny from stakeholders, but are essential to their
operations.1
To address the question of when firms engage in
activities that, although scrutiny hazarding, are core
to their strategy, we draw on evidence from the ac-
counting (Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002) and
political science literatures (McArdle, 2013), which
have suggested that decision-makers are motivated
to reduce the duration of negative events, even at the
expense of greater momentary negativity. The idiom
of “ripping off the Band-Aid” is reflective of this
principle, such that there is a perceived benefit to
enduringmore or sharper pain over the short term in
exchange for less pain over the long term. We utilize
theory on stakeholder attention (Barnett, 2014;
The authors would like to thank Jon O’Brien, Matt
Semadeni, Brian Anderson, and Peter Nahm for their
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1 Importantly, thenecessity of engaging in such activities
does not, by itself, connote industry-level stigma (e.g.,
Mishina & Devers, 2012), but instead points to the costs of
doing business across a wide array of task environments.
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Madsen & Rodgers, 2015) and event strength
(Morgeson,Mitchell, & Liu, 2015) to argue that social
disapproval is one key driver of scrutiny-hazarding
activity by managers.
In this research, we use the term “scrutiny” in
reference to burdensome attention directed toward
the firm (Desai, 2011; Fiss & Zajac, 2006), and define
“scrutiny-hazarding action” as those activities that
are indispensable to the firm’s strategy, but are also
likely to burden the firm’s managers by attracting
a problematic, aggregate level of scrutiny from
stakeholders. We focus on aggregate scrutiny be-
cause actions that draw scrutiny from a narrow
stakeholder contingent are unlikely to burden the
firm sufficiently to prompt managers to engage in
activities that might engender more scrutiny
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
Social approval or disapproval arises from stake-
holders’ intuitive, affective perceptions about how
“likable” a firm is (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Conven-
tional theoretical perspectives have indicated that,
when faced with social disapproval, firms may re-
spond by avoiding activities that put the firm “under
the microscope” (i.e., increase scrutiny) (Staw,
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), attempting to distract
or placate stakeholders (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, &
Shapiro, 2012), or pursuing a problem-resolution
agenda aimed at rectifying the source of the problem
(Audia & Greve, 2006). Research has suggested that
social disapproval may motivate organizational
change (Bednar, Boivie, & Prince, 2013), divestment
from stigmatized industries (Durand & Vergne,
2015), or the use of strategic noise to distract from
scrutiny (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011). How-
ever, these theoretical perspectives and available
evidence have focused on actions that deviate from
the status quo, and thus have not addressed how
firms respond when they cannot deviate or distract
from status quo activities, such as when these activ-
ities are strategically indispensable. That is, inmany
instances, managers are unable to sidestep stake-
holder scrutiny, and major strategic changes are
unwarranted or unfeasible. This raises the question
of how social disapproval influences managerial
decision-making related to core strategic behaviors
that are likely to arouse scrutiny.
We posit that, in the wake of social disapproval,
managerswill engage in scrutiny-hazarding action to
stymie protracted negativity (Bies, 2013; Morgeson
et al., 2015) and to exploit stakeholders’ limited
capacity to attend and proportionally respond to tem-
porally clustered and repeated events (Barnett, 2014;
Miller,1956).Werefer to thisphenomenonas“scrutiny
bundling.” We develop this scrutiny-bundling frame-
work in two key ways.
First, we contend that the linkage between social
disapproval andscrutiny-hazardingaction is stronger
when the focus of the media coverage is connected
to the scrutiny-hazarding action that managers can
pursue. For example, a petroleum company that
faces social disapproval for its involvement in envi-
ronmentally controversial hydraulic fracturing ac-
tivities (fracking) may hasten its drilling activities
because the disapproval due to fracking is closely
related to the scrutiny-hazarding action of drilling.
On the other hand, the same firm may be only
somewhatmotivated to hasten disclosure of its plans
for new pipeline construction, as the fracking-based
disapproval is relatively less directly related to the
scrutiny-hazarding action of pipeline construction.
Both the increase in drilling and the pipeline con-
struction are activities that are unavoidable and scru-
tiny hazarding. The relevant question to our research
ishow the firm’s burdenof social disapproval—that is,
the magnitude and the subject content—influences
whenmanagersdecide toengage inscrutiny-hazarding
action.
Second, we extend this scrutiny-bundling frame-
work to contend that not all firms are equally pres-
sured to respond to social disapproval in the same
way. We theorize that managers at firms that are ei-
ther (a) large in size or (b) perform well relative to
their financial aspirations are less sensitive to the
pressure of social disapproval, and therefore are less
likely to engage in scrutiny bundling. Therefore,
we hypothesize that a firm’s size and its aspiration-
relative performance each serve as buffers to atten-
uate the relationship between social disapproval and
scrutiny-hazarding action.
We point to the limits of information processing
and stakeholder attention to highlightwhymanagers
may pursue a scrutiny-bundling response (i.e., more
scrutiny-hazarding action in the wake of social
disapproval). We examine these issues within the
context of the upstream petroleum industry, using
a sample of 100 firms.We augment the findings from
our quantitative analysis with color casting by ex-
ecutives in theupstreampetroleum industry. That is,
to further understand the phenomenon at hand, we
presented our research question and findings to ex-
ecutives and asked them whether, in fact, media
coverage matters to managers, and how it influences
decision-making related to strategic activities. We
thereby gain a richer understanding of the scrutiny-
bundling perspective that is grounded in both theory
and practice.
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We make several contributions with our study.
First, we contribute to the burgeoning social evalu-
ation literature in management scholarship by
underscoring the role that social approval plays in
shaping strategic decision-making. As elucidated by
Petkova et al. (2014), much of the prior work in this
stream has addressed how social evaluations such as
reputation lead managers to make decisions aimed
at cultivating and protecting this intangible asset
(Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), but this has left the gen-
eral influence of social evaluations on broader
decision-making largely unexamined. Our study
extends this line of research to demonstrate the
temporal nature of managerial decision-making in
thewake of social disapproval, such that,when faced
with social disapproval, managers might choose to
engage in scrutiny-hazarding action, thereby allevi-
ating the burden of prolonged scrutiny.
Second, we extend recent conceptual work on
how social approval influences crisis response
(Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015) by applying similar reason-
ing to social approval’s influence on strategic
decisions relating to core activities. How social
disapproval influences a firm’s strategy is largely
unknown, not least because scholars have attempted
to distinguish this affective dimension of social
evaluation from the adjacent, but more deliberate,
analytical assessments of the firm’s appropriateness
(i.e., legitimacy) and ability to deliver value
(i.e., reputation) (Bitektine, 2011; Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015). Furthermore, many of the studies on social
disapproval have focused on organizational re-
sponses to “extreme”contexts, suchashigh-pressure
events—for example, crises or the revelation of or-
ganizational wrongdoing (e.g., Desai, 2011)—or re-
sponses within contested or stigmatized industries
(Durand&Vergne, 2015). Such extreme contexts and
events are, as implied by the descriptor itself, rare
and not representative of a majority of social evalu-
ation circumstances. On the contrary, many firms
deal with the chronic but critical pressure from
stakeholders in the form of social disapproval
(Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015) based on the activities in
which the firm engages in its everyday operations.
We therefore contribute by theorizing and testing the
influence of social approval on decisions relating to
activities that are integral to the firm’s daily opera-
tions, which describe the majority of firm activity.
Third,weexpandupon thenotionof “buffers” from
external pressure (e.g., Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai,
2008) by exploring two contingency factors: firm size
and aspiration-relative performance. That outside
pressure has a sizable influence on decision-making
is well established. For example, the managerial dis-
cretion literature has indicated that stakeholder
pressure can constrain discretion latitude such that it
influences how managerial decision-making should
be interpreted (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Shen &
Cho, 2005). However, missing from this discussion is
comparable attention to the protective factors that
may mitigate the influences of this pressure on orga-
nizations. With this study, we contend that a firm’s
size and its aspiration-relative performance at least
partially insulate it from the hazards of such outside
pressure, thereby alleviating some of the constraints
on managers’ strategic decision-making.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Scrutiny Bundling as a Response Strategy to
Social Disapproval
Scrutiny consists of attention that is inherently
burdensome, because the firm is “under the micro-
scope” (Desai, 2011; Fiss&Zajac, 2006). Importantly,
scrutiny is distinct from social disapproval. Fol-
lowing Bundy and Pfarrer (2015: 345), social ap-
proval here refers to “evaluators’ general affinity
toward an organization.” This affinity “can be lev-
eraged tobuild andmaintain relationships, engender
higher performance, and enhance an organization’s
chances of survival (e.g., Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova
et al., 2012).” Social disapproval is the extent of un-
favorable affinity that evaluators have toward the
organization. This implies that firms facing dis-
approval are disadvantaged with respect to their
potential to build relationships and improve their
survival prospects. Following prior research, we
measure social disapproval via negative media
coverage (Bednar et al., 2013).
Unlike social disapproval, scrutiny does not imply
negative judgment. Social disapproval, on the other
hand, connotes negative judgment but does not im-
ply the presence of burdensome scrutiny on the firm.
Thus, a major difference lies in the evaluative nature
of social disapproval versus scrutiny. Whereas dis-
approval puts a firm at a disadvantage relative to
relationships and survival, scrutiny is a concen-
trated, burdensome formof pressure that comes from
focused attention on the firm and its activities.
What is scrutiny-hazarding action? Every firm
action falls on a continuum from “very low likeli-
hood of attracting scrutiny” at one extreme to “very
high likelihood of attracting scrutiny” at the other.
The scrutiny-hazarding action to which we refer
circumscribes those activities at the higher end of
this continuum. According to theory on stakeholder
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attention (Barnett, 2014; Madsen & Rodgers, 2015),
stakeholder groups differ and each group may have
different perceptions of whether a certain action
constitutes a problem that warrants scrutinizing the
firm. As an example, clear cutting in the forestry in-
dustry may attract scrutiny from some stakeholder
groups, such as environmental activists or people
who live in the communities next to the clear-cutting
activity, because these stakeholder groups viewclear
cutting—although core to many forestry company’s
operations—to be incompatible with their values
or beliefs. Thus, clear cutting represents scrutiny-
hazarding action. Similarly, product testing in the
cosmetics-manufacturing industry may attract scru-
tiny from animal activist groups, such as PETA, be-
cause these groups view animal testing as unethical
and cruel, yet product testing is a U.S. Federal Drug
Administration requirement. As such, our threshold
for scrutiny-hazarding action is not whether just one
stakeholder group directs scrutiny toward the firm,
butwhether theaggregate scrutiny that is expected to
arise as a result of an action is burdensome for the
firm.
Distraction of stakeholders is substantially more
difficult and less feasible when managers are obli-
gated to execute scrutiny-hazarding action because
these activities are indispensable to the firm’s strat-
egy. The strategic importance of the scrutiny-
hazarding action and its close conceptual linkage
with what the firm is “known for” diminishes the
utility of strategic noise (Graffin et al., 2011) and
otherdistracting andplacating techniques (Zavyalova
etal., 2012) inminimizing thehazardof suchscrutiny.
This is because stakeholders carefully attend to the
salient aspects of the firm that best capture their in-
terests, and a firm’s core activities are central among
these (Hosmer & Kiewitz, 2005). This implies that the
activities in question cannot be circumvented or ex-
changed for activities that are less scrutiny hazarding.
As suggested to us by one vice president of engi-
neering, in some instances, “There is no compromise
short of getting out of the business that satisfies the
press. Companies running their business within the
regulations will continue to ensure they do so, even
in the face of opposition.”
To illustrate, a steel manufacturing firm releases
sulfur dioxide, a pollutant that can become trapped
between buildings and the ground, in the process of
metalworking. This sulfur dioxide is an unwanted
byproduct of the steel manufacturing process, and
howmanagers choose to dealwith this byproduct, or
how much they choose to produce knowing this by-
product can be harmful, represents decisions related
to everyday operations of the plant, and not simply
a one-off decision resulting from a crisis or organiza-
tional wrongdoing (Desai, 2011).2 Thus, managers
make decisions about when to manufacture more (or
less) steel—and therefore when to produce more (or
less) byproduct. Similarly, petroleum companies rely
on two activities for operation—accessing and de-
veloping petroleum—and the latter often evokes con-
troversy because of the impact its extractivenature has
on the environment. In other words, barring a radical
change of business practices (e.g., new processes for
steel manufacturing, economically viable alternatives
to fossil fuels), a firm’s immediate circumstances may
induce managers to hasten more scrutiny-hazarding
action (e.g., manufacturing more steel and releasing
more sulfur dioxide, and increasing its drilling pro-
gram and extracting more petroleum resources).
Our contention is that scrutiny-hazarding action
describes activities that are integral to the firm’s
strategy, but may place the firm at risk for burden-
some scrutiny in the short term. Because scrutiny-
hazarding action describes activities that are part of
everydayoperations, and thusunavoidable, the open
question is: When do managers decide to engage in
scrutiny-hazarding action?
Context specificity of scrutiny-hazarding action.
Any particular activity may attract scrutiny in one
task environment, yet have a different, less negative
effect in a different task environment. For example,
in the petroleum industry, resource development
(including drilling and production) tends to attract
significant scrutiny, as development is a notoriously
controversial issue. By contrast, in the real estate
industry, resource development (including building
homes and office complexes on property the de-
veloper already owns) may be viewed more favor-
ably. As such, our aim is not to point to a list of
universally applicable scrutiny-hazarding actions,
but rather to develop our understanding of scrutiny-
hazarding action by zeroing in on a specific context
and elaborating how managers’ use of scrutiny-
hazarding action is influenced by social disapproval.
We contend that scrutiny bundling represents
a response to social disapproval in which managers
hasten scrutiny-hazarding action. Although this
2 Our conceptual framework is based on “everyday”
actions, rather than the extreme cases of organizational
crises. Nevertheless, the crisis response literature provides
an insightful adjacent logic. Stakeholders tend to perceive
crisis responses as genuine and effortful when they are
closely related to the crisis, making these more effective at
placating stakeholders’ concerns (Zavyalova et al., 2012).
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temporally condenses scrutiny of the firm, it does so
to limit the aggregate, burdensome effect of scrutiny.
Embedded within this expectation are two funda-
mental assumptions, which we discuss in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
The perceived hazard of protracted scrutiny.
The first assumption underpinning our framework is
that protracted scrutiny toward the firm presents
more of a threat—from management’s perspective—
than does a briefer, higher magnitude of scrutiny.
The accounting and political science literatures pro-
vide a worthwhile starting point for this conceptual
development.
One well-known concept in the accounting liter-
ature is the phenomenon of the “earnings bath”
(Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002), in which man-
agers amplify aweak earnings report by significantly
underreporting earnings in a particular time period,
thereby facilitating a stronger earnings report in the
future. Inparticular, a firm’s earningsperformance in
a given quarter is compared against a “consensus
estimate” of analysts (Beshears & Milkman, 2011).
The failure to achieve an earnings target casts doubt
on the firm’s ability to deliver consistent perfor-
mance over time (Fox, 1997; Graham, Harvey, &
Rajgopal, 2005). Because of the hazards associated
with a negative earnings surprise, managers may
tweak the firm’s financial statements in the wake of
disappointing earnings (Brown & Pinello, 2007),
shifting future expenses andwrite-offs to the current
period so that the firm’s future net earnings imply an
upward trajectory. The shifting of these burdensome
expenses to the already problematic period of
underperformance is the basis for the “big bath” or
“earnings bath” notion. Other sources have sug-
gested that some new CEOs may engage in similar
behavior, assuming greater expenses at the outset to
allow for a seeming improvement in returns over
their tenure (Blackstone, 2014).
The notion of the earnings bath in the accounting
literature parallels a similar phenomenon in the po-
litical science literature. In the political science
sphere, the rapid-fire revelationof badnewshasbeen
underscored as a means of moving past one’s trans-
gressions in order to clean up one’s image going
forward. For example, over the course of the 2016
U.S. Democratic presidential primary and the ensu-
ing general election campaign, the periodic revela-
tions about Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email
server during her tenure as secretary of state to al-
legedly send classified correspondence may have
harmed the public’s perception of her more than a sin-
gle, dramatic revelation might have (Bradner, 2015).
Similarly, throughout the 2012 American presidential
campaign, then-presidential candidate Mitt Romney
was recorded (Moorhead, 2012) making what was
generally viewed as a disparaging remark about awide
swath of the American electorate:
There are 47 percentwho arewith [PresidentObama],
who are dependent upon government, who believe
that they are victims . . . who believe that they are
entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you-
name-it . . . And they will vote for this president no
matter what.
In the wake of the backlash of social disapproval
from this statement, Romney’s campaign released
his 2011 tax returns just days later. Though Romney
was originally reluctant to reveal details of his
wealth, several journalists posited that Romney’s
team timed the release strategically, believing that
the added scrutiny would be less damaging if it
came amid the fallout surrounding his “47 percent”
comment (Cillizza, 2012).
Within the corporate context, Tylenol and parent
company Johnson & Johnson faced a difficult public
relations episode several decades ago. In 1982, an
individual who was completely unrelated to either
company inserted cyanide into Tylenol capsules,
and precipitated the deaths of seven people who
used the product. Once this information became
public, Johnson & Johnson’s CEO James Burke pub-
licly disclosed the weaknesses of the Tylenol bottle
design as part of the problem, and instituted a pre-
emptive recall before the full extent of contamination
was known (Moore, 1982). These preemptive actions
ultimately cost the company an estimated $100
million (Wharton School, 2012). However, the de-
cision to hasten revelations about bottle design flaws
and thus increase the scrutiny Johnson & Johnson
faced might have minimized the cumulative fallout
that these separate revelations would have garnered
if they were temporally more distant. Tylenol re-
covered from the incident, and increased its share of
the analgesic market to 35% by the end of the fol-
lowing year.
The available theory and evidence in the man-
agement literature also suggests that negative stimuli
can be more problematic when protracted, or drawn
out over time. Morgeson et al. (2015) asserted that
organizational events can be variously disruptive,
critical, and novel, and that the duration of a prob-
lematic event—such as a protracted lawsuit—is
proportional to its impact on the firm (Morgeson &
DeRue, 2006;Morgesonet al., 2015).AsMorgesonet al.
(2015: 527) noted, “When events linger, additional
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attention and resources may be needed to ultimately
respond to the event itself.” In aggregate, the pre-
ceding argumentation underscores that managers
may perceive scrutiny bundling as a worthwhile
tradeoff of “more pain now” in exchange for “less
pain over time”—similar to the notion of “ripping off
the Band-Aid.”
Attention fatigue and stakeholders’ limited range
of response. The second assumption is that managers
perceive that temporally clustering scrutiny-hazarding
action will actually help reduce this perceived haz-
ard of such scrutiny over time. Although we are not
concerned with the normative aspects of scrutiny
bundling—that is, whether it is effective at reducing
long-term scrutiny—it is worth considering why,
when facedwith social disapproval,managers choose
to engage in more scrutiny-hazarding action. The
notion that it may be preferable to minimize the du-
ration of a negative event is an intuitive concept, with
supporting evidence in both the psychology and
management literatures.
Evidence from psychology suggests that, when an
individual endures an uncomfortable, painful, or
otherwise negative event, clustering the negative
sensations toward the beginning of the experience
creates a perception of improvement, so that the in-
dividual’smemory of the event ismore positive than
if the negative sensations had been evenly spread
throughout the whole experience (Ariely, 1998;
Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). Evidence is similar
in the management literature, and suggests that
managers sometimes strive to deliver bad news
swiftly (Bies, 2012), but may, at other times, drag
their feet in delivering negative information to out-
side stakeholders (Black, 1976).
Furthermore, stakeholder attention is bounded,
and stakeholdersmay not proportionately scrutinize
or be influenced by negative stimuli when it is tem-
porally concentrated.As one journalist summarized,
“There is only so much bad news people can take in
all at once, so you might as well cram all the bad
stuff” into a shorter time period (McArdle, 2013).
The idea that individuals are limited in their ability
to attend tomultiple stimuli at oncehas recentlybeen
applied to theory of stakeholder attention within man-
agement research (Barnett, 2014; Madsen & Rodgers,
2015). Relevant to our framework is Barnett’s (2014)
“noticing”phase,whichsuggests that stakeholdersmay
not seek to process additional negative information
even when it is readily observable. That is, not all
stakeholders are equally proactive at taking in addi-
tionalnegative informationas suchstimuli accumulate.
In the“assessing”phase, stakeholdersmaybevariously
“cognitively busy” such that their limits of infor-
mation processing prevent them from proportion-
ately increasing their unfavorable response to
additional negative revelations about the firm. Fi-
nally, in the “acting” phase, Barnett posited that,
beyond a certain threshold of negative stimuli,
stakeholders may perceive their efficacy in bringing
about change as diminished should they decide to
take action, because the aggregate problem has be-
come too big to meaningfully influence. All three of
these elements suggest that there are diminishing
implications for stakeholder responses with in-
crementally greater negative stimuli in a narrow time
period.
The preceding sections suggest that, in thewake of
social disapproval, managers will perceive the has-
tening of scrutiny-hazarding action as worthwhile,
metaphorically “ripping off the Band-Aid” in an at-
tempt to reduce the aggregate burdenof scrutinyover
time. Regardless ofwhether such a course of action is
effective at minimizing aggregate scrutiny over a pe-
riod of time,we expect that the limitedprospects that
managers face will lead them to hasten scrutiny-
hazarding action subsequent to social disapproval
(i.e., engage in scrutiny bundling). Formally stated:
Hypothesis 1. Social disapproval is positively related
to scrutiny-hazarding action.
Conceptual Closeness between the Focus of Media
Coverage and Scrutiny-Hazarding Action
An important contingency on the predicted
linkage between social disapproval and scrutiny-
hazarding action is the conceptual closeness be-
tween the two. If the relationship between these two
elements is tenuous,we expect aweaker relationship
between social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding
action, for two reasons. First, if evidence mirroring
the subject of the earlier social disapproval were
allowed to continue to “trickle out” incrementally
over time, the danger of confirming a stakeholder’s
initially unfavorable perception would be greater
(e.g., Tverskey & Kahnemann, 1974). The second
reason is more nuanced.
Individuals are less prone to proportionally attend
to temporally clustered stimuli relative to stimuli
that are spread out over time, and the conceptual
closeness of the clustered stimuli further compli-
cates the process of maintaining attention. Stake-
holders are likely to perceive a series of similar,
clustered events as“moreof the same,” andnot attend
to these events as much as they might to the same
events spread out over time. Weick, Sutcliffe, and
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Obstfeld (2005) underscored that individual ob-
servers must first parse a stream of events into sepa-
rate, relevant stimuli before focusing on them—a task
made more difficult when the events are tightly
clustered in a short span of time.
For instance, if a forestry firm experiences social
disapproval because of its deforestation activities
(social disapproval related to a lack of environmental
stewardship), we expect managers to subsequently
engage in activities that might also indicate a lack of
environmental stewardship—for example, construc-
tion of more logging or transport roads, or logging fa-
cilities. The capacity for stakeholders to notice and
proportionally respond to each additional bit of news
related to a lack of environmental stewardship is di-
minished relative to their capacity to attend and re-
spond to similar events spread out over time.
In other words, the presence of social disapproval
based on lack of environmental stewardship might
sparkmanagers toengage inother scrutiny-hazarding,
environmentally related activities. In contrast, if the
same firm cultivated social disapproval because of,
for example, its poor treatment of employees, man-
agers would not hasten environmentally related
scrutiny-hazarding action, because there is less of
a chance that this (largely unrelated) action would
shorten the time span of the scrutiny. In the second
example, the conceptual closeness of the social dis-
approval and scrutiny-hazarding action is weaker
because the firm’s “poor treatment of employees” is
not related to a lack of environmental steward-
ship. The strongest relationship within this scenario
would likely be when social disapproval stems
from deforestation activities, and the firm is able to
subsequently hasten or increase those very same de-
forestation activities in the short term, to avoid
delayed scrutiny if those same activities were done at
a later time.
We contend that, when the subject of the social
disapproval is closely tied to the scrutiny-hazarding
action available to the manager, managers will be
more likely to engage in scrutiny bundling in an ef-
fort to minimize the duration of the scrutiny experi-
enced by the firm. This conceptual argument was
partially supported by an individualwith experience
in the chief operating officer role, who posited, “I
would say that [negative media coverage] could
cause my company to more closely internally moni-
tor and report on certain aspects of our operations—
especially areas that may be the focus of the media
attention.” The conceptual closeness between the
subject of the social disapproval and the scrutiny-
hazardingactionmay increase theperceptionof utility
from scrutiny bundling because it effectively enables
managers to more quickly “rip off the Band-Aid.”
Thus:
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between social dis-
approval and scrutiny-hazarding action is stronger
(more positive) the more the focus of the media
coverage is conceptually related to the scrutiny-
hazarding action.
Buffering Factors
Not all decision-makers are affected equally by
social disapproval from external observers. Man-
agers’ actions may be influenced by two key attri-
butes: (1) the consistency of the feedback that filters
into their decision processes, and (2) the extent to
which they believe that the firm will be harmed by
failing to take action.When feedback is inconsistent,
it is less likely to demonstrably influencemanagerial
decision-making. Signals are more influential when
they are consistent (Heil & Robertson, 1991), and
evidence has suggested that the same applies to
managers’ interpretation of the veracity of perfor-
mance feedback signals. For example, the literature
has suggested that the effect of negative media cov-
erage (a way of assessing social disapproval) on an
individual firm can be diluted if such negative cov-
erage is endemic across numerous firms within an
industry (Zavyalova et al., 2012), or if a firm in
a stigmatized product category attempts to establish
presence in a nonstigmatized category (Vergne,
2012). That is, certain factors are known to buffer
managers from being sensitive to social disapproval,
diluting its effect, and therefore the presence or ab-
sence of those factors influence how vulnerable
firms are to social disapproval. We argue that the
tendency for social disapproval to spur scrutiny-
hazarding action is contingent on the firm’s sensi-
tivity to the social disapproval; this sensitivity, in
turn, depends on the consistency of performance
feedback provided to managers, and whether—in
light of this signal consistency—managers perceive
that the social disapproval constitutes an exigent
threat that warrants action.
Social disapproval amounts to stakeholders’ gen-
eral lack of affinity toward an organization (Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015), and, as such, the crux of its influence
on managerial decisions arises from managers’ be-
liefs that the disapproval constitutes a hazard that
may inhibit the firm’s core operations. However, the
extent to which decision-makers perceive that the
firm is “doing well” mitigates this hazard, because
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a firm that is achieving its core performance objec-
tives may be less sensitive to the opinions of outside
observers. In the subsequent sections, we elaborate
on the role of a firm’s aspiration-relative perfor-
mance, as well as its size—vis-à-vis its aggregate re-
source endowment—as factors that attenuate the
relationshipbetweensocialdisapproval andscrutiny-
hazarding action. Both of these factors influence the
extent to which managers believe the firm is suffi-
ciently vulnerable to warrant remedial action.
Aspiration-Relative Performance as a Buffer
A firm’s financial performance constitutes a cred-
ible signal to decision-makers that the firm is in
a strong strategic position. Indeed, prior arguments
and evidence have suggested that a firm’s financial
performance is perhaps the quintessential indicator
of organizational success (e.g., Bednar et al., 2013). In
their study of how strategic change is influenced by
negative media coverage, Bednar et al. (2013) pro-
posed that strong financial performance “muddies”
the signal from negative media coverage, thereby
weakening its effect on inducing strategic change.
Though our research question differs from that
of Bednar et al. (2013), in that we focus on social
disapproval’s influence on everyday operational
decisions via scrutiny-hazarding action, the funda-
mental premise that financial performance affects
managers’ sensitivity to the firm’s social approval
remains salient. To this point, we have discussed
social disapproval as a behavioral pressure upon
a firm’s decision-makers. In line with this reasoning,
an aspiration-relative performance metric aligns
with current theory regarding the salience of per-
formance aspirations on firm behavior (Bromiley &
Harris, 2014) because of both the evidence provided
by the signal itself as well as what this information
implies for the firm’s survival prospects.
Decision-makers must make sense of the signals
received from various feedback sources as part of the
decision process (Lucas, Knoben, & Meeus, 2018),
and this process is more straightforward when these
signals are aligned (Barron & Rolfe, 2012). Both so-
cial disapproval and poor performance relative to
aspirations constitute forms of negative performance
feedback, providing a consistently unfavorable sig-
nal as to the firm’s performance, as well as adding to
the perception that the firm is vulnerable unless it
takes remedial action. This addresses both condi-
tions that we expect influence managers’ sensitiv-
ity to the disapproval, and, as such, firms that are
underperforming financially are likely to be especially
motivated to engage in scrutiny bundling by pursu-
ing greater levels of scrutiny-hazarding action in the
wake of social disapproval.
Conversely, superior financial performance moti-
vates a preference for the status quo, because threat
exigency is reduced when the firm performs well
relative to its aspirations (Audia, Locke, & Smith,
2000; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Strong perfor-
mance may support a belief in the correctness of
current decision-making processes and outcomes
(Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993),
which in turn could prompt inertial tendencies and
make relevant decision-makers less sensitive to so-
cial disapproval. Similarly, strong aspiration-
relative performance may make decision-makers
feel less vulnerable to social disapproval, as di-
rectly engaged stakeholder groups (e.g., employees
or shareholders) may be perceived as less likely to
exert pressure on a management team that produces
strong financial performance (Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015). Moreover, the conflicting signal of superior
financial performance in the wake of social disap-
proval undermines the consistency of unfavorable
feedback about the firm’s performance, thereby
weakening the perception that action is needed.
Becauseof these twoconditions—inconsistencyof
feedback and a lesser perceived threat of social
disapproval—when the firm has surpassed its fi-
nancial performance aspirations, managers are less
likely to be concerned about the pressure of in-
cremental social disapproval, and will be less moti-
vated to engage in scrutiny bundling. For these
reasons, we hypothesize that high performance rel-
ative to aspirations attenuates the relationship be-
tween social disapproval and scrutiny-hazarding
action.
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between social dis-
approval and scrutiny-hazarding action is weaker
(less positive) the stronger the firm’s aspiration-
relative performance.
Firm Size as a Buffer
Firm size is a second key factor that both adds to
managers’ feedback about the firm’s performance
and influences the extent to which managers per-
ceive the firmasvulnerable to social disapproval and
the scrutiny that may follow. On the one hand, firm
size can serve as a signal of organizational success
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990) and legitimacy
(Greve, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1965). Thus, not unlike
our prior argument that strong aspiration-relative
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performance muddies the signal of social disap-
proval, a firm’s large size may similarly make the
firm’s managers less sensitive to the signal of social
disapproval. Managers at large firms may be more
likely toperceivepast firmactions as anecessarypart
of establishing a noteworthy presence in the in-
dustry, and feel that those decisions were justified
due to the organization’s size.
Additionally, large firms face distinct exigencies
and advantages relative to their smaller counter-
parts. For example, larger firms might attract or ac-
quire resources more easily, due, in part, to their
elevated legitimacy and prestige relative to smaller
firms (Sherer & Lee, 2002). Larger firms may also be
seen as easy targets for social disapproval if they
represent exemplifications of a stigmatized category
(Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009; Vergne,
2012)—there is a largermetaphorical “target on their
back.” Nevertheless, there are two key reasons why
managers of large firms are less likely to scrutiny
bundle.
First, large firms may be less vulnerable or sensi-
tive to unfavorable judgment (i.e., social disap-
proval) (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). In particular, any
single given pressure is less likely to threaten a large
firm’s short-term survival relative to a smaller firm
(Audia & Greve, 2006; Levinthal, 1991). While large
firms may represent easy targets of social disap-
proval, any given attack is perceived by managers as
less threatening to the firm’s survival (Cyert &March,
1963; Hambrick, MacMillan, & Day, 1982). As such,
managers of larger firms may be less influenced by
social disapproval compared to managers of smaller
firms. Second, and similarly, larger firms with
greater legitimacy (Sherer&Lee, 2002)maybe able to
take the social disapproval “in stride,” as outside
stakeholders’ affinity toward the firm—whether
positive or negative—will not be the sole de-
terminant of the firm’s success or failure (Meyer &
Zucker, 1989). As such, social disapproval is less
likely to prompt a scrutiny-bundling response via
engagement in scrutiny-hazarding action.
Indeed, small firms are more objectively vulnera-
ble to external pressures such as social disapproval,
in that they are relatively less likely to weather
a storm of negative affinity compared to their larger
counterparts (MacMillan, 1980; Singh, 1990).
Moreover, the fact that managers of small firms are
likely to be sensitive to this reality points to both the
critical levers of perceived vulnerability and con-
sistent negative feedback that we hypothesized will
prompt scrutiny bundling. Small firms are more
predisposed to react to perceived threats because of
their increased vulnerability in the face of such
threats (Cooper, Willard, & Woo, 1986).
As such, we expect that managers of small firms
facing social disapproval are particularly motivated
to engage in scrutiny-hazarding action, whereas
managers of large firms are less motivated by social
disapproval, and are therefore less likely to take such
action. For these reasons, we contend that a firm’s
size attenuates the relationship between social dis-
approval and scrutiny-hazarding action.
Hypothesis 4. The relationship between social dis-
approval and scrutiny-hazarding action is weaker
(less positive) the larger the firm’s size.
METHODS
Sample Context: The Upstream Sector of the
Petroleum Industry
Wetest our conceptual framework in the context of
the upstream petroleum industry. This sector entails
accessing and developing hydrocarbons, and in-
cludes activities for “exploration for crude petro-
leum and natural gas” as well as “the production of
oil through themining and extraction of oil” (OSHA,
2013). This industry is an appropriate context for
several reasons. First, demand for petroleum re-
sources is increasing in developed, and especially
developing, economies, andpetroleum resources are
also vital to other, nonenergy industries, such as
agriculture, clothing and textiles, sports footwear
and apparel, and cosmetics manufacturing (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2015). Further,
the petroleum industry is an established one in
which the utility of the key resource is persistent
over time, implying that incumbents in this industry
knowwhat key resource is valuable (petroleum) and
what capabilities are needed to extract value from
that resource (resource access and development),
which has important implications for scrutiny-
hazarding action.
Second, this industry receives varying amounts
of positive and negative media coverage, providing
the variance necessary to examine the differential
influences of social disapproval. In particular, the
resource development activity (i.e., oil drilling and
production) is an increasingly contentious activity in
the modern sociopolitical landscape, providing an
appropriate setting to test the “scrutiny-hazarding”
feature of our framework.
Third, as noted in the industry description above,
the upstream petroleum industry relies on two
dominant activities—gaining access to petroleum
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resources (i.e., exploration of potential fields that
may or may not contain sufficient petroleum to ex-
tract at a later date), or development of petroleum
resources (i.e., extraction and production of petro-
leum from fields with known petroleum reserves).
These two activities, referred to in this research as
resource access and resourcedevelopment, are stage-
linked as part of the resource cultivation process
(Stadler, Helfat, & Verona, 2013). Both activities carry
economic risk, but resourcedevelopment activities are
more visible and have greater potential to generate
controversybecause resourcedevelopment represents
the extractive activities (drilling) required to produce
a barrel of oil or equivalent (natural gas; production).
Therefore, resource development activities—drilling
and production—carry a greater hazard for scrutiny
than do resource access activities (exploration). We
later discuss this in greater detail as it pertains to our
dependent variable.
Data Collection
Data for this study were collected from Canadian
firms operating in the upstream sector of the petro-
leum industry. To create the sample, we used Com-
pustat to identify firms operating in the standard
industrial classification 1311 and headquartered in
Canada from 2003–2010, inclusive. We then
accessed Canada’s System for Electronic Document
Analysis and Retrieval database and searched com-
pany filings for each firm-year. This represents an
appropriate sample for two key reasons. First, Ca-
nadian reporting standards are unique because firms
are required to disclose annual dollar figures allo-
cated for both resource access and development ac-
tivities. As indicated above, access anddevelopment
are the two main strategic activities for firms oper-
ating in this industry (Bass&Chakrabarty, 2014), and
represent firm efforts to either access new resources
through largely geologically based efforts (access)
or develop existing resources through largely
engineering-based efforts (development). Second,
Canada is resource-rich in petroleum and has the
third largest oil reserves in the world, behind Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela (WorldAtlas, 2015). Thus,
because the country has a large amount of oil re-
serves that have not yet been accessed or developed,
firms operating in Canada make decisions regarding
the extent to which they invest in resource devel-
opment relative to resource access activities that
constitute the firm’s business activities portfolio.
Data for financial allocations toward access and
developmentwerecollected fromavarietyof company
reports, including the annual report, the annual in-
formation form, and disclosure of oil and gas activi-
ties. The result of these efforts was a unique database
of 631 firm-year observations from 149 firms, with
Canadian dollar amounts ascribed for access and
development activities for each firm for each year. In
addition to these petroleum data, we collected firm
data from Compustat and various media sources
(described in detail below). After accounting for
missing data on key constructs, our sample was 326
firm-year observations from 102 firms.3
Dependent Variable: Scrutiny-Hazarding Action
In theupstreampetroleumindustry, a firm’s relative
focus on the two core activities of this industry—
resource development and resource access—provides
an appropriate measure for scrutiny hazarding. Re-
source development within the upstream sector is
defined as the “activities aimed at developing oil and
gas reserves to the point where they are commercially
usable” (Stadler et al., 2013: 1787). Following in-
dustry standards, this activity describes petroleum
development, which refers to “the drilling and
bringing into production of wells” (Langenkamp,
1994: 105), and thus includes both drilling and pro-
duction.Resource accesswithin the upstream sector
is defined as the “activities directed toward obtain-
ing oil and gas reserves” by seeking “to obtain new
physical resources” (Stadler et al., 2013: 1787). Using
industry nomenclature, this activity describes petro-
leum exploration, which refers to “studying large re-
gions that do or could contain petroleum, identifying
progressively smaller areas of progressively greater in-
terest in these until a prospect worth drilling has been
identified” (Chapman, 1983: 67).
While both activities involve risk in the form of
uncertain economic investment to some extent, re-
source development significantly increases the
3 We ran multiple t-test comparisons between the final
achieved sample and those observations that were drop-
ped due to missing data. In all cases, the achieved sample
included all 326 observations from our analyses. We ran
the tests on our dependent variable (ratio of dollars spent
on resource development to resource access activities),
return on assets (ROA), and firm size. The dropped set
included 289 observations and 287 observations, re-
spectively. For the dependent variable and ROA, the test
statistics were nonsignificant, and the test statistic was
significant for firm size. This is not a surprising finding, as
we expect firms that report development and access in-
vestments and that receive media coverage will be larger
than those firms for which we lack such data.
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hazard of scrutiny from external stakeholders be-
cause of the public-facing nature of development
activities. Resource development involves the
physical act of extracting petroleum resources (i.e.,
drilling) via producing oil wells (production), which
increases the potential for scrutiny because such
activities are readily observable (De Bondt & Thaler,
1990; Waldron, Navis, & Fisher, 2013), and because
oil drilling and production are often associated
with environmental degradation and safety hazards
(Pennington, Pennington, & Bennett, 2009; World
Wildlife Fund, 2016). Resource access activities, by
comparison, largely entail geological surveying, and
collecting and interpreting seismic data. Although
a necessary precursor to resource development
(Stadler et al., 2013), these activities are not as ob-
servable nor inherently controversial, and therefore
do not carry the same scrutiny hazard compared to
resource development activities.
Most firms in our sample engage in both resource
development and resource access activities, and
decision-making regarding investment in one in-
fluences investment in the other—for example, in-
vestment in development comes at the expense of
access, and vice versa. A unique attribute of our Ca-
nadian data is that capital budgets for firms in this
industry typically represent a ratio of resource de-
velopment to resource access activities, and thus we
capture the relative nature of the relationship be-
tween these two activities in our dependent variable.
This relative nature was indicated to us by a petro-
leumengineerwith over 35years of experience in the
industry, who advised, “Typically, oil companies’
budgets are approved annually and there’s a broad
division of the capital between exploration, pro-
duction, and facilities and infrastructure,” with the
last category representative of the firm’s property,
plant, and equipment, rather than a strategic activity.
Thus, our dependent variable captures strategic
decision-making relating to investing in one activity
in relation to the other.
We therefore adopt a ratio of dollar amount
invested in resource development divided by dollar
amount invested in resource access. We first incre-
mented all development and access investment
values by 1 to eliminate zero values, and then log-
transformed each value to normalize the variable’s
distribution, consistent with Stadler et al. (2013).
Due to the presence of zero values after the log-
transformation, we incremented all development
and access investment values by 1, and then created
a ratio of investment in development activities to
investment in access activities.
Independent Variables
Social disapproval. The media plays a particu-
larly important role in disseminating otherwise un-
observable information about the firm and its
activities, and is themost frequently studied external
evaluator of organizations (Bitektine, 2011). We
therefore follow precedent in prior work on social
evaluations by using negative media coverage as
a gauge for overall social disapproval (Durand &
Vergne, 2015; Vergne, 2012).
The media’s reach and influence has grown con-
siderably in recent years due to advancements in
mobile device technology and computer use
(Mitchell & Page, 2015). As outlined by Bednar et al.
(2013), the media serve three major functions when
they report on businesses: (1) they publicize the
views of external stakeholders, allowing different
parties to influence others’ perceptions; (2) they re-
port on issues and events within the “corporate
landscape”; and (3) they serve as an “independent
investigator” or “watchdog” for society.
To collect media coverage data, we used the list of
firms created in our description of the petroleum
data above, and, largely following prior precedent
(Bednar et al., 2013),we searched formedia coverage
of the sample firms in The Wall Street Journal,
Businessweek, Forbes, The New York Times, and
The Washington Post. Since our sample is Canadian
oil and gas firms, we also included two Canadian
newspapers, The Globe and Mail andNational Post,
as well as the industry trade publication The Daily
Oil Bulletin. We extracted the text of these 34,104
articles, and, for eacharticle,measured thecontent of
“negative emotion” using the Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count (LIWC) software program. To help en-
sure that we only included articles for which the
content pertained to the focal firm, we followed
precedent (Bednar et al., 2013) by excluding articles
that mentioned more than four firms or in which the
focal firm was not mentioned in the first 25% of the
article, which resulted in a total of 6,152 articles. To
investigate the relevance of the articles for the firms
of interest, we randomly selected 180 articles (3% of
our final sample of articles) and manually coded
them for whether they dealt primarily with the firm
of interest. A total of 169 out of the 180 (93.88%)
articles primarily reported on the focal firm, suggest-
ing thatourmediadataare relevant toour sample.The
resulting measure was aggregated by firm-year, using
the average of all articles’ negative valence scores in
a given firm-year. We adopted a one-year lag for our
variable, as we are interested in how the prior year’s
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coverage influences the firm’s current activities
(Bednar et al., 2013).
The overall affective tone of any given media re-
port may be positive or negative, though there are
generally observable trends within a given industry
(Deephouse, 2000; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Within
the context of our sample, positive coverage typi-
cally relates to the “value-adding” characteristics
of the industry, such as the critical and valuable
nature of petroleum resources to a variety of in-
dustries, including energy, agriculture, clothing and
textiles, sports footwear and apparel, and cos-
metics manufacturing (U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration, 2015). An example from the data is as
follows:
The company drilled one successful well that tested
at 230 [barrels] a day and is awaiting tie-in . . . it has
been making progress on the planning and develop-
ment of a polymer-based flood for the same field . . .
[the company] plans to drill a core well and has con-
tinued tomakeprogress on the [steam-assisted gravity
drainage] pilot application . . .Thecompany said all of
these efforts are focused on its goal of converting re-
sources to reserves, which it believes will add con-
siderable dollar value per [barrel] of oil in the ground.
Negative coverage, on the other hand, typically
relates to the controversial “value-depleting” aspects
of the industry, such as issues surrounding envi-
ronmental practices, from the way resources are
extracted from the earth (e.g., hydraulic fracturing or
“fracking”) to the industry’s responsibility for envi-
ronmental accidents (e.g., oil spills). As an example
from the data: “Oil spill still poisoningwildlife years
later, native band charges; Doig River hunters say
they’re finding animals with swollen, black in-
testines and possible tumors.”
Focus of media coverage.Tocapture the extent to
which the content of the coverage was related to the
scrutiny-hazarding action of resource development,
we measured the focus of media coverage from
which we measured social disapproval. We first
counted the number of times a set of development-
related word segments appeared in each news arti-
cle. These development-related word segments ad-
dress concepts that capture the major parts of the
petroleum resource development process (drilling
and production), and include “drill,” “exploit,”
“produc*,” “develop,” “gather,” “storage,” “export,”
and “extract.” As an illustrative example from the
data: “The company expects to gain significant
operating synergies within the development, which
will create the potential to drive exploitation
opportunities similar to those seen at Primrose over
the last decade.” We divided the total count of
development-related word segments by the overall
word count for the article, and then averaged these
article-specific development-focused content scores
within-firm over the calendar year, resulting in
a measure consistent with the other firm-year vari-
ables in our models. Consistent with our measure of
social disapproval, we lagged this measure by one
year.
Aspiration-relative performance. The aspirational
performance level was computed based on the as-
sumption that managers attend to both industry per-
formance and their own firm’s performance when
settingorganizational aspirations, and that sometimes
one is more influential for aspirations. Specifically,
we used the “switching model” of aspiration level,
employed innumerousprior studies (for a review, see
Bromiley & Harris, 2014), as represented in the fol-
lowing formulae:
Aspirationi,t21 5 IndustryROAt22   if   ROAi,t22
, IndustryROAt22
Aspirationi,t21 5 1:05pROAi,t22   if   ROAi,t22
. IndustryROAt22
That is, when the firm’s performance—captured as
ROA—in theprior period (t –2) has fallen short of the
industry average performance in that period, the
firm’s aspirational level in thenext period (t–1) is set
equal to the industry’s average performance in the
prior period (t – 2). However, when the firm’s per-
formance in period “t – 2” has exceeded industry
performance, the aspirational target for period “t – 1”
is set equal to the firm’sprior performance at time “t–
2,”multiplied by 1.05, as firms are expected to adjust
their aspirations upward as their performance im-
proves. Then, aspiration-relative performance is
operationalized as the firm’s actual performance in
“t – 1”minus the aspirational level in period “t – 1.”
Due to the presence of outliers, we winsorized to the
99th or 1st percentile (Wooldridge, 2010).
Firm size.We measured firm size via the natural
log of total assets. Initial models suggested that
firm size may induce the possibility of multi-
collinearity due to high variance inflation factors
associated with the variable. We addressed this
possibility by orthogonalizing firm size utilizing a
modified Gram–Schmidt procedure, via the “orthog”
command in Stata 14.0, consistent with prior litera-
ture (e.g., Greve & Seidel, 2015; Pollock & Rindova,
2003).
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Controls. Due to the fact that slack can influence
investment decisions (Greve, 2003), we controlled
for financial slack by taking the difference between
current assets and current liabilities (Mishina,
Pollock, & Porac, 2004). Similarly, we controlled
for the debt-to-equity ratio (George, 2005). We also
controlled for total inventory, as this could influence
whether a firm emphasizes development or access
investment. Firms that are growing their sales may
invest differently compared to slower-growth firms,
so we controlled for sales growth rate. Due to the
influence of quantity of media coverage on firm
outcomes (e.g., Kulchina, 2014; Pollock & Rindova,
2003), we controlled for the overall word count of all
articles included in our analysis for a particular firm.
To better isolate the influence of social disapproval
rather than social approval, we controlled for posi-
tive media coverage by including the “positive
emotion” score from the LIWC analysis. Both the
overall word count and positive media coverage
variables were lagged one year. Finally, we included
year dummies to control the influence of time.
Analysis and Results
We adopted a fixed-effect specification to account
forunobserved firm-level heterogeneity (Wooldridge,
2010), and used robust standard errors. All in-
dependent and control variables were standardized
prior to entering into the regression equation, and
prior to calculating interaction terms (Cohen, Cohen,
West, & Aiken, 2003). Due to the presence of multi-
variate outliers, we excluded observations that were
greater than63 SD of the standardized residuals (n5
15, n 5 2). As we will discuss in the robustness
analysis section here following, we employed alter-
native estimation techniques, which led to largely
similar results.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and
correlationmatrix for the variables used in our study.
Note that the values presented in Table 1 are non-
standardized and nontransformed. The values for
resource development and resource access are in-
dividually reported in the table to provide greater
clarity of the variables. Table 2 presents the results
from the fixed-effects regression analysis. Model 1
contains the control variables; Model 2 contains the
controls and the independent variables; Model 3
contains controls, independent, and aspiration-
relative performance interaction variables; Model 4
contains controls, independent, and firm size in-
teraction variables; Model 5 contains controls, in-
dependent, and the development-focused content
interaction variables; and Model 6 includes the full
model.
Though the b coefficient for negative media cov-
erage inModel2 is positive and significant (p5 .000),
the variable is not significant in the fullmodel shown
inModel6.As such,Hypothesis 1,whichposited that
social disapproval is positively related to a firm’s
investment in scrutiny-hazarding action—that is,
resource development relative to resource access—
is not fully supported. We will discuss the implica-
tions of this in the Discussion section, below. Based
on Model 6, the positive and statistically non-
significant b coefficient for the negative media cov-
erage 3 development-focused content interaction
(p5 .12), though in the hypothesized direction, does
not support Hypothesis 2. However, and as we will
explore further in the Discussion section, the in-
teraction is statistically significant in Model 5 (p ,
.001)—when the “buffer” interactions are omitted.
The negative and significant (p , .01) b coefficient
for the negative media coverage 3 aspiration-
relative performance interaction, and the negative
and significant (p, .05)b coefficient for thenegative
media coverage 3 firm size interaction, indicate
support forHypotheses 3 and4,whichpredicted that
aspiration-relative performance and firm size, re-
spectively, would exert attenuating influences on the
social disapproval–scrutiny-hazarding action re-
lationship. We plotted the interactions in Figures 1
and 3, and examined where these interactions were
statistically significant (i.e., at which levels of the
moderators), as depicted by the marginal effect plots
in Figures 2 and 4. As such, for the sake of accuracy,
we chose the “high” and “low” levels of the modera-
tors in Figures 1 and 3 according to the high and low
endsof the rangewhere those interactionswere in fact
significant. This allowed us to more accurately plot
the interactions by depicting where they are signifi-
cant, and not where they are nonsignificant (i.e., 13
SD above the mean). We elaborate on this in the
Discussion section.
In Table 2, the coefficient for negative media cov-
erage in Model 2 indicates that a one standard de-
viation increase in the prior year’s negative media
coverage is associated with a 0.52 unit increase (p,
.001) in the resource development–resource access
ratio. The only other variable that is significant in
Model 2, the positive media coverage control vari-
able, is significant and in the opposite direction, in
that it appears to discourage resource development
spending relative to resource access spending.
However, what we might call negative media cov-
erage’s “development promotion effect” is almost
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twice that of positive media coverage’s “develop-
ment prevention effect.” This is consistent with the
tendency for negative signals to bemore salient than
positive signals (e.g., Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Im-
portantly, however, there is emerging consensus
that the main effect’s results should be interpreted
in the full model in the presence of significant in-
teraction effects (e.g., Aguinis, Edwards, & Bradley,
2017).
In the full model, a one standard deviation in-
crease in the aspiration-relative performance vari-
able weakens the effect of negative media coverage
by 0.07 units, whereas a similar increase in “size”
(total assets) weakens negative media coverage’s ef-
fect by 0.18 of a standard deviation. Comparatively
speaking, in the full model, these “buffering” in-
teraction effects have a stronger influence on the
criterion variable than all but the effect of positive
media coverage and two-year effects (omitted from
Table2 forparsimony). Importantly, ourmaineffect is
no longer significant in the full model, and this is po-
tentially due to the strength of these countervailing
interaction effects. As we elaborate further in the
Discussion section, it may be that negative media cov-
erage is most consequential when size and aspiration-
relative performance are at low levels, and that, by
explicitly accounting for their effects, this attenuates
the effect of negative media coverage alone.
Robustness and Endogeneity Analyses
Our sample was restricted to firms that received
media coverage, though this restriction may in-
troduce concerns of sample selection bias, as there
TABLE 2
Fixed-Effects Regression Results (DV: Resource Development Relative to Resource Access)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
b/SE b/SE b/SE b/SE b/SE b/SE
Financial slack 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Debt-to-equity ratio 20.00 20.02 20.03 20.01 20.02 20.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Total inventories 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Sales growth rate 20.01 20.01 20.01 0.01 20.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Word count 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.21
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Positive media coverage 20.20 20.27* 20.28* 20.21† 20.27* 20.24†
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Negative media coverage 0.52*** 0.28** 0.42** 0.08 0.05
(0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Focus of media coverage (FMC) 20.14 20.14 20.13 20.10 20.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Aspiration-relative performance (ARP) 20.13 20.11 0.04 20.11 20.00
(0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05)
Assets (logged) 20.71 20.94 20.47 20.75 20.71
(0.69) (0.75) (0.72) (0.67) (0.77)
Negative media coverage3 FMC 0.29** 0.16
(0.09) (0.10)
Negative media coverage3 ARP 20.11*** 20.07**
(0.02) (0.02)
Negative media coverage3 assets 20.28*** 20.18*
(0.07) (0.07)
Constant 1.76** 1.77** 1.63** 1.72** 1.65** 1.58*
(0.52) (0.55) (0.59) (0.56) (0.59) (0.60)
Log likelihood 2497.52 2482.55 2478.35 2478.65 2476.88 2474.09





2018 651Titus, Parker, and Bass
were a number of firms within the population that
did not receive media coverage. We explored the
possibility that this bias could influence our results
by utilizing a technique developed by Heckman
(1979) and frequently used in the literature to ac-
count for selection bias (e.g., Bednar, 2012). The first
step captured whether a firm received media atten-
tion via a probit model that included the total in-
vestment in both resource development and resource
access activities (i.e., a sum of the amount invested in
both activities), net income, employees, cash, total
current assets, and total sales. This stage created a
nonselection hazard, referred to as the inverse Mills
ratio. We then retested each regression and included
the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable in each
equation. The results from each regression were
similar to those reported in Table 2, indicating that
sample selection bias, if present, does not impact our
results.
Though the Heckman technique discussed above
addresses endogeneity concerns that arise from
sample selection bias, endogeneity may arise from
other sources. Endogeneity refers to a correlation
between the independent variable and the equation’s
disturbance term, and may arise from a number of
possibilities, including simultaneous causality,
omitted variables, and others (Semadeni, Withers, &
Certo, 2014). To investigate whether endogeneity
was biasing our estimates, we employed a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) procedure discussed by
Semadeni et al. (2014). This procedure involves the
identification of instruments that are individually
and jointly significant predictors of the potentially
endogenous variable (in the current research, social
disapproval). This procedure was followed by a
Sargan–Hansen test to evaluate whether the in-
struments were properly excluded from hypothesis
testing, and a Davidson–MacKinnon test to evaluate
whether an instrumental variable approach was ap-
propriate for hypothesis testing.
FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
Average Marginal Effects of Negative Media Coverage on Development versus Access across Level of
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Our instruments for social disapproval—the “cog-
nitive mechanisms” and “human” variables gener-
ated by the LIWC 2007 software—were derived from
the content analysis procedure we employed to cal-
culate our social disapproval independent variable,
and from the same time (t – 1). The “cognitive mech-
anisms” variable indicates the extent to which the
document employs terminology reflecting, for exam-
ple, causal relationships, insight, tentativeness, etc.
We expect it to positively correlate with social dis-
approval, because the media, in their role as infome-
diaries, attempt to “make sense” of firm action. The
“human” variable reflects the extent to which the
document refers to people (words such as “child,”
“adult,” “male,” “female,” etc.). We expect it to pos-
itively correlate with social disapproval due to the
people-centric and intuitive nature of the social dis-
approval formation process (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
In the first-stage equation in the 2SLS procedure,
where the social disapproval variable is treated as
potentially endogenous, our instruments were in-
dividually (b5 0.11, p, .01; and b5 1.52, p, .001,
respectively) and jointly significant (F5 18.96, p,
.001) predictors of social disapproval. The second
stage yielded a nonsignificant Sargan–Hansen test
statistic, indicating that the instruments were
jointly valid and properly excluded from the
second-stage equation of the 2SLS, providing evi-
dence that we properly specified our 2SLS estimator.
The nonsignificant test statistic for the Davidson–
MacKinnon test indicates that a noninstrumental
variable estimator is preferred, because the focal var-
iable is not likely to be endogenous (Semadeni et al.,
2014). In consideration of this analysis,we found little
evidence that endogeneity meaningfully biases our
estimates.
Finally, because a firm fixed-effects specification
discardsbetween-firmvariance thatmaybeof interest
(Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017), we explored the
robustness of our model by utilizing the generalized
estimating equations (GEE) method, and employed
robust standard errors and an exchangeable correla-
tion structure (Krause, Filatotchev, & Bruton, 2015).
Results are supportive of our fixed effects regression,
though it is noteworthy that the interaction with re-
source development-focused contentwas statistically
significant in the hypothesized direction (positive b
coefficient, p , .05) in the full model. Similarly, we
estimated our model with an Arellano–Bond gener-
alized method of moments (GMM) procedure, which
allowed us to use a past set of “internal” variables
contained in thepanel—that is, a laggedversionof our
dependent variable—as instruments for the current
dependent variable (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).
Results of the GMM are supportive of all hypotheses,
similar to those from the GEE procedure.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research is to develop the
scrutiny-bundling perspective, which posits that
social disapproval influences scrutiny-hazarding
FIGURE 3
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action—those actions that are a core component of
a firm’s operations, but hazard the possibility of
burdensome scrutiny. Conventional theoretical
perspectives have not sufficiently addressed this is-
sue. For example, perspectives rooted in problem
resolution in the wake of performance feedback
(Audia & Greve, 2006) or the distraction or placation
of stakeholders (Cyert & March, 1963; Graffin et al.,
2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012) have not directly
addressed the issue of firm activities central to the
firm’s operations but that carry the hazard of in-
ducing scrutiny. These activities all fall under the
status quo, and therefore conventional perspectives
about status quo deviation do not as clearly apply to
this circumstance.
The limited research that has addressed firm re-
sponses to social disapproval has suggested that so-
cial disapproval prompts risk aversion (Durand &
Vergne, 2015)—but has focused primarily on the
extreme context of stigmatized industries. Despite
the substantial merits of these prior efforts, most
firms do not operate in stigmatized industries, and
many firms engage in activities that, although scru-
tiny hazarding, are core to the firm’s operations, and
are not necessarily misconduct.
To help address this considerably unexplored
middle ground corresponding to the majority of
firms’ experiences, we created a conceptual frame-
work, based primarily on concepts from the ac-
counting and political science literatures, that we
term “scrutiny bundling.” We found evidence for
efforts aimed at scrutiny bundling, allowing the firm
to metaphorically “rip off the Band-Aid,” exchang-
ing heightened immediate scrutiny for a potential
reduction in scrutiny over the long term. We hy-
pothesized that social disapproval corresponds to
greater scrutiny-hazarding activity (i.e., scrutiny
bundling), and that this relationship is amplified
when the focus of the media coverage is more di-
rectly related to the scrutiny-hazarding action. We
then hypothesized that both size and aspiration-
relative financial performance reduce the salience of
disapproval for large and high-performing firms,
thereby attenuating the linkage between social dis-
approval and scrutiny-hazarding action, and thus
lessening the prospect of a scrutiny-bundling re-
sponse. Our empirical analyses of the resource de-
velopment and resource access activities of a sample
of Canadian oil and gas firms provided general sup-
port for our conceptual framework.
There are two unexpected and noteworthy find-
ings fromour analyses. First, themain effect relationship
is only significant in the absence of the interaction
between social disapproval and firm size. In other
words, the interaction of social disapproval and
firm size “washes out” the variance from the social
disapproval–scrutiny-hazarding action main effect
relationship. This finding should be considered in
conjunction with Figure 4, which illustrates the av-
erage marginal effect of social disapproval across
a range of values for firm size. Figure 4 indicates that
the interaction is significant at low values of firm
size, but there is a lack of significance at higher
values of firm size. This suggests that the interaction
of social disapproval and firm size is quite pro-
nouncedamong small firms, but less salient for larger
firms. We believe this is an interesting finding, and
generally supportive of our theory that managers of
large firms are less sensitive to, or are buffered from,
the pressure of social disapproval.
The second unexpected finding is that the in-
teraction between social disapproval and focus of
media coverage, though not statistically significant
in the full model, is significant (and in the predicted
direction)whenmodeledwithout thepresence of the
buffering interactions. Further, the relationship is
statistically significant with the GEE and GMM
modeling techniques in the full model (in the pres-
ence of all interactions). This suggests that a strong
linkage between the focus of the media coverage
underlying any social disapproval and the scrutiny-
hazarding action may exacerbate scrutiny-bundling
efforts. However, when considered in the presence
of relevant buffering factors—that is, aspiration-
relative performance and firm size—the relation-
ship may be less consequential to our framework. In
other words, buffers seem to “matter more” than if
the focus of themedia coverage ismore closely tied to
the scrutiny-hazarding action (e.g., in news articles
for which the subject is hydraulic fracturing drilling
practices). This evidencehas important implications
for both theory and practice.
Implications for Theory
Despite substantial work examining how social
evaluations can be valuable to firms and influence
firm performance (e.g., Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova,
2010), very little attention has been paid to the in-
fluence that these constructs have on strategic de-
cisions that pervade core organizational operations
(e.g., Petkova et al., 2014). This is largely due to the
relatively recent progress in distinguishing between
various adjacent social evaluation constructs, such
as legitimacy, status, reputation, stigma, and social
approval (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).
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The work that has examined how social evalua-
tions influencedecisions has been largely focusedon
the decisions of other firms due to the focal firm’s
status (Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014), reputation
(Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997), or stigma
(Reuber & Fischer, 2010). Thus, studies of how social
evaluations influence a firm’s own decision-making
are rare (e.g., Petkova et al., 2014). To that end, our
study suggests that managerial decisions regarding
scrutiny-hazarding action may be closely linked
with social disapproval, in a manner different to
what we would expect from threat rigidity (Staw
et al., 1981) or behavioral theory reasoning (Cyert &
March, 1963). First, social disapproval alone does
not appear to motivate threat rigidity, which should
correspond to a reduction in scrutiny-hazarding ac-
tion. Second, in contrast to problemistic search’s role
in rectifying underperformance, social disapproval
cannotbe remedied throughscrutiny-hazardingaction.
Substantial opportunities remain to examine the link-
ages between social evaluations and strategic decision-
making,particularlybyapplying the scrutiny-bundling
perspective we demonstrate here.
The scrutiny-bundling perspective may offer
scholars another means to interpret phenomena that
are unexpected from a threat-rigidity or behavioral
theory perspective.Moreover, the scrutiny-bundling
perspective may be applicable to more than just so-
cial disapproval. It could potentially be applied to
a range of circumstances in which managers are
motivated to reduce aggregate scrutiny at the expense
of greater short-term scrutiny. Perhaps the greatest in-
sight fromourstudy is that firmsexhibit apropensity to
scrutiny bundle, or “rip off the Band-Aid,” in thewake
of socialdisapproval.Our findingsarenovel in termsof
challenging and extending existing assumptions and
theory, and also resonated with a group of Canadian
executives that work in the upstream petroleum in-
dustry, with whom we discussed our research. First,
we found evidence that executives do indeed care
about disapproval. As one executive, who served as
both vice president of engineering and vice president
of operations, mentioned, “Everything always goes
back to—especially in a public company—‘What’s
the press gonna say about us doing this?’” A vice
president of exploration noted:
Any bad press for a public company is immediately
discussed by the board, management, and major
shareholders. Most often, a special, quiet meeting is
convened. Remember, a public entity is all about
image and shareholder perception. Any crack of that
image could multiply and shatter all. This translates
into lower share price: not good.
Others expressed concern about disapproval even-
tually bogging down the organization: “The fear is, if
bad press continues, then focus is redirected from
corporate goals and readjusted to the press.”
Our results also bolster the logic around the buff-
ering effects of certain firm-level characteristics
FIGURE 4
Average Marginal Effects of Negative Media Coverage on Development versus Access across


























–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3
Firm size
2018 655Titus, Parker, and Bass
(Audia & Greve, 2006; Desai, 2008), such as size and
performance. Some work has considered the haz-
ardous effects that prominence can have on ampli-
fying stakeholder pressure (DeBondt &Thaler, 1990;
Pollock, Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008; Waldron et al.,
2013), though relatively less attention has been paid
to the benefits that certain organizational factors can
provide. We add nuance to this discussion by dem-
onstrating that, although social disapproval may
create pressure, size and financial performance may
alleviate that pressure. Figure 2 illustrates the aver-
agemarginal effectof socialdisapprovalacross a range
of values for aspiration-relative performance, and in-
dicates that social disapproval is related to scrutiny-
hazarding action at lower levels of aspiration-relative
performance, though the relationship becomes sta-
tistically nonsignificant at high levels of aspiration-
relative performance (greater than plus-one standard
deviation).
As previously mentioned, Figure 4 indicates that
the interaction is significant at low values of firm
size, but nonsignificant at higher values of firm size.
This suggests that the interaction of social disap-
proval and firm size is quite pronounced among
small firms, but less salient for firms that are at least
“average size” or larger (“average” being inferred
from the zero value for the standardized size mea-
sure).Whenwe asked our executives why this might
be the case, one suggested that “well-defined checks
and balances for a large company should ensure that
media scrutiny would not uncover any practice that
would need to be revised as a result of media
investigations.”
Implications for Practice
Perhaps the most salient practical implication of
our work is the link betweenwhat themedia say and
the choices firms make in response. When experi-
encing social disapproval, firms might engage in
scrutiny-hazarding action in an effort to endure
greater near-term scrutiny in the hope that it will
subside over the long term. Given the evidence of
scrutiny bundling, we also suggest that our research
might provide competitive insights for firms. When
firms face higher levels of social disapproval, they
are more likely to engage in scrutiny-hazarding ac-
tion. Thus, managers paying close attention to the
extent of social disapproval experienced by their ri-
vals may be able to predict these rivals’ subsequent
activities. Such managers may have greater oppor-
tunity to formulate a response to the scrutiny-
hazarding action of social disapproval-experiencing
rivals. Since the social disapproval-experiencing ri-
val may engage in more scrutiny-hazarding action,
this could be very useful information formanagers of
firms that are looking to sell assets thatwould require
scrutiny-hazarding action (e.g., selling producing oil
fields) or looking for a partner to take on the activities
that may engender scrutiny (e.g., a joint venture
intended to develop a new oil field into production).
The manager might view the social disapproval-
experiencing rival as a potential buyer or a partner
for scrutiny-hazarding action.
Limitations and Future Research
The present study is subject to certain limita-
tions. We have argued that, when an organization is
more vulnerable to scrutiny—by virtue of its smaller
size or poorer aspiration-relative performance—
managers are more likely to engage in scrutiny bun-
dling by pursuing scrutiny-hazarding action in the
wake of social disapproval. However, it is possible
that this tendency will reverse at extremely high or
low levels of vulnerability that we were unable to
capture in our data. That is, if the firm is very vul-
nerable to heightened scrutiny, it may elect to draw
out the duration of low-grade scrutiny because it
cannot withstand the hazard of heightened scrutiny
even for a brief period. On the other hand, if the firm
is extremely robust to heightened scrutiny, it may
take steps to invite greater scrutiny in the hope that
its overall duration—and, by extension, its long-term
impact—can be reduced. Subsequent studies may
advance our knowledge of this issue by examining
the extremes of scrutiny vulnerability among firms of
various sizes and performance. Similarly, we framed
our arguments around the pressure of social disap-
proval, though there are a number of other issues that
affect strategic decision-making. Although we in-
cluded a number of control variables and tested the
robustness of our results in various ways, we are
unable to account for all of the various issues that are
relevant to the investment decision-making process.
Moreover, as the purpose of this research is de-
scriptive rather than normative, we have offered no
prescriptions about whether scrutiny bundling is an
appropriate or effective means of advantaging the
firm or enabling greater managerial discretion by
reducing stakeholder pressure. However, it may be
that managers can use the media as a strategic tool
based on the activities they know theymust perform
in the near future. When facing scrutiny, managers
might be advantagedby saving announcements likely
to be judged more positively by stakeholders—for
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example, charitable donations, joining a task force
designed to lead innovations in environmental stew-
ardship, or an expansion that would increase the
number of local jobs—for a time when the firm is ex-
periencing less social disapproval. Once the firm is
under scrutiny, itmightmake themost strategic sense
for the firm to embrace that scrutiny and engage in
activities that engender more scrutiny. In that light,
managers can choose to save more positive an-
nouncements until the spotlight is off of the firm.
CONCLUSION
In a time in which the media is ubiquitous and
consumers have ready access to a variety of infor-
mation about firms and their activities, it is important
to consider how managers respond to the reality of
social disapproval in their strategic activities. While
prior research has considered response strategies ori-
ented around avoidance, distraction, or problem res-
olution, we propose that decision-makers, when faced
with social disapproval, may engage in scrutiny bun-
dling, or temporally increasing scrutiny-hazarding
action. Our study challenges and extends existing un-
derstanding of how firms respond to social disap-
proval, especially as related to core activities that
comprise a firm’s everyday operations. In doing so, we
offer a step toward improving understanding of how
firms respond to social disapproval given the socio-
political realities of the modern marketplace.
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